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Experience, as the term is ased in mach of 
current psychology, is assumed to he intrinsical­
ly meaningful. Ogden’s stand that "there are no 
meaningless experiences" (13, p. 227) and that of 
Gault and Howard (7, p. 285) that "meaning is an 
intrinsic aspect of each and every item of our 
experience" serve to illustrate the most prevalent 
attitude. In opposition to. this view, John Dewey 
has advanced the theory that experience is mean­
ingless at times. This paper is the outcome of 
an attempt to elaborate and substantiate his claim, 
and to indicate the significance of ’meaningless 
experience’ for psychology. The investigation is 
undertaken in an effort to make the concept of 
experience more adequate and explicit for psycho­
logy than we believe has generally been done.
The Occurrence of ’Meaningless Experience’
Dewey distinguishes two types or levels of 
consciousness: (l) The psycho-physical level,
or that of meaningless experience--which is illus­
trated in the case of at least most animal experi­
ence, in the newborn infant, and, at times, approx-, 
imately if not completely in the grown man. (2)
The mental level or that of meaningful experience. 
(3, p. 303). Before this theory can be clearly 
understood, Dewey's notion of meaning must be pres­
ented. Briefly it is that meaning is the pointing 
function which some experiences have in referring 
to something beyond themselves. The meaningless ex-
periences are thus those which do not have this 
pointing function, that is, they are immediate 
qualities or immediately given experiences— re­
ferring to nothing beyond themselves. By way of 
illustration, meaning in the infant is at first 
the relationship between immediate qualities, and 
only later, a relationship between meanings, or 
between immediate qualities and meanings.
Before proceeding further, the concept of im­
mediate qualities must be made free from obscurity. 
Comparison with a physical object as such may be 
of some aid to this end. For example, an object 
which has never been a matter of experience in any 
way is a mere existence; it is a bare event;-it 
just iss.̂  Now, an experience in its immediacy is 
as meaningless at the time it is had as is such an 
object. An experience of this character is mean­
ingless for the reason that it mates no specific 
connections with an apperceiving mass which has 
been made by the influence of previous experience.
Among recent critic® of the immediate quality 
concept, is Singer (17, p. 171), who contends that 
quality is a matter of difference between experi­
ences, and so, is. not immediate. In reply we may 
say that he is identifying quality and meaning, 
for the quality of an experience is the experience 
in its self-enclosed immediacy, while meaning in 
its first estate refers to a relationship between 
qualities, that is, between immediate experiences. 
What, if not qualities, go to make "differences” , 
possible Singer does not say. He fails to observe 
that instead of the differences making the quali­
ties, the variance in qualities makes possible
*This statement carries with it an acceptance 
of Dewey’s (3, chap. 3) refutation of teleology as 
being an empirical fact. It assumes neither accept 
ance nor denial of teleology as a super-empirical 
possibility, being purely an empirical interpreta­
tion. It accepts mechanism as an empirical fact 
but not as an absolute explanation of things.
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"differences." He fails to observe that if an ex­
perience in its immediacy has no quality, (one 
might say no ’properties’) it cannot be seen in 
relation to other experiences to take on what he 
calls "quality."
Singer should never have become involved in 
a confusion of quality and meaning had he taken 
the genetic approach in his endeavor to arrive at 
the nature of meaning. Obvious as is the wisdom 
of this approach, it has not been given due recog­
nition in current theory. It is with'this last 
fact in mind that the present dissertation con­
tends that the answer to so simple a question as 
"Koes experience become more meaningful as one 
matures?" offers an entering wedge which promises 
to pry into the secrets of the meaning problem.
How, does experience become more meaningful 
as one proceeds from infancy to maturity? Cer­
tainly no psychologist would do such violence to' 
fact as to deny this growth, but an implication 
which has not been taken account of by those main­
taining the intrinsic meaningfulness of conscious­
ness is this: The newborn babe is as undeniably
conscious as are his parents, and yet, to endow 
him with equal meaningfulness of experience is 
extremely far-fetched in view of what we know of 
the growth of meanings.• This query suggests the 
difference between the mere fact of consciousness 
and meaningful consciousness.
The difference between this genetic view­
point and that of the intrinsic meaningfulness 
of consciousness is well illustrated in the fol­
lowing statement by Ivlunsterberg (11, p. 161): "A
word which we hear, a picture' which we see, a tool 
which we grasp, has meaning for us when the sense 
impression fuses with associations which indicate 
its relations." How, when one reflects upon this 
conception, one wonders just where, when, and how 
the newborn infant came into possession of associa­
tions to indicate the relationships of his first 
conscious experience. For, when one thing means
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another, there is a relationship between two ex­
periences which one has had in conscious life.
From the genetic point of view it seems rea­
sonable to suppose that the first conscious res­
ponses of the child as purely impulsive, only 
taking on meaning when some relationship is seen 
between some of. them. Before any relationship 
6an be observed between the conscious experiences 
of the impulsive plane, they must occur in a cer­
tain sequential order so that in time the experi­
encing being may observe that one experience bears 
a certain relation to another and thus can mean 
that experience. That is to say, an infant with 
the ordinary equipment for experiencing would 
never acquire any meanings if it were possible to 
place him under conditions so that he could never 
note any sequential order of events, for, if his 
experiences could be so radically varied in res­
pect to the order in which they occur that no two 
experiences could ever be observed to have any 
relationship to each other, the infant would never 
experience a meaning though he might have ever so 
many experiences. Briefly, without recurrent se­
quences of experiences, no meanings could develop.
The emphasis of much of current psychology 
upon adult introspection has thus led it to ignore 
an important phase of the meaning problem— that of 
the subjective side of the infant’s life. For ex­
ample, the statement of Pillsbury (15, p. 5) that 
psychology "takes into consideration nothing that 
is not to be discovered by the individual who re­
members” apparently ignores the subjective side of 
the babe's mental life. Now, to omit from consid­
eration such genuine psychological subject-matter 
would seem to be neglecting an essential phase of 
experience. Accordingly, recognition must be made 
of the fact that there are other mental contents 
with which we should deal in psychology besides 
those of individuals who have a system of meanings 
sufficiently complex that they can introspect and 
describe them. The response to impulse as a sub­
jective factor must, therefore, be given its right-
fu.1 place in psychology if the nature of meaning 
is not to he misconstrued.
We next consider the thesis that grown man 
can have meaningless experiences. Comparison of 
the human with the animal response in certain 
situations may throw some light upon the problem.
In this regard, most psychologists will agree that 
the dog in savagely devouring a piece of meat is 
simply exercising direct response to stimulus as 
is conceded to he the case in most animal behav­
ior. In such direct response there can be nothing 
1X1 GOH3C1 OU.SX10 3S S3CC epting quality. To attribute 
to it meaning, that is, reference to something be­
yond itself, would seem to be reading into it the 
content of human experience. How, a starving man 
seems to approximate having this level of experi­
ence during the first moments of partaking of food. 
Individuals dying of thirst also illustrate the 
condition of undergoing most intense quality and 
a negligible amount (if any) meaning. (It may be 
recalled that such examples as these last are given
by some writers as the nearest approximations of
"pure instinct" in adult human experience.)
Professors Cole and Smith have described ilium
inating instances of such approximations of mean­
ingless experience. Professor Cole writes (2, p. 
147): "During a lecture to a large class in psy­
chology there was a sudden, deep, roaring, ominous 
noise directly over the heads of the students. For 
part of the minute they sho?/ed a sudden, startled 
surprise and even fear. Note-taking stopped and 
instinctively everyone straightened up. Then just 
as suddenly these expressions ceased, tension re­
laxed, and the noise was recognized as snow slid­
ing from the roof. The first moment was one of 
sensation and strange, surprising sensation, the 
second was one of perception of the object, snow." 
Professor Cole believes that during the first mo­
ment a "pure sensation" was had. We can agree that 
an approximation of pure sensation or meaningless 
experience was had, but withhold affirmation, at 
least tentatively, that pure meaninglessness was
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experienced. An equally interesting experience 
is told by Professor P. 0. Smith of the University 
of Montana. While reading on a porch daring a 
summer day he was startled by a sudden sound from 
an adjoining room. Perhaps the first moment was 
characterized by meaningless experience, since it 
vaguely seems to have been a mere T,startled aware­
ness." Realization that the sensation was strange 
and auditory followed almost immediately, and, 
very gradually, fragments of the meaning of the 
sound to him were assembled until he knew that he 
had heard the tone of a violin. The thrill of 
watching a meaning so strikingly unfold made an 
indelibile impression upon his mind. Now, it would 
seem that we need not hesitate to admit the first 
moment of Professor Smith’s experience to have 
been an approximation of meaninglessness, but we 
should hesitate to dogmatically assert it to be 
totally meaningless.
The following experience of the writer may 
serve as further illustration: Por years it has
been his habit to conclude bathing by sliding to 
his back in the tub and basking in the heat of the 
water. After a short time all meaning seems to 
have disappeared due to the dulling effect of the 
heat and all associations seem to have stopped.
The condition is in no sense that of being uncon­
scious or asleep and the slang phrase that there 
is "nobody home" perhaps affords its most adequate 
description. There seems to be an abundance of 
quality, but it may be doubted whether there is 
any meaning at all.
Such instances make clear certain manifesta­
tion of approximate meaningless experience in the 
adult. It now remains to note that our problem is 
centered about the question whether or not quality 
can be experienced at any given degree of vividness 
without a proportionate amount of meaning. In this 
connection, if consciousness is intrinsically mean­
ingful, an individual must always be experiencing 
meaning to the extent that his consciousness is 
vivid. But there seems to be evidence to show that 
this is not true. Por instance, as was mentioned
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"befora, the infant is as truly conscious as is the 
add.lt in spite of its poverty of meanings. And 
observation of the behavior of the infant would 
seem to show that his consciousness is as vivid as 
that of the adult. (A familiar example of this is 
the satisfaction an infant seems to derive from 
nursing.) Apparently, then, grown man has approx­
imately meaningless experience since he seems to 
have certain experiences which are very vivid but 
are not proportionately meaningful.
Having our best evidence of approximations of 
meaningless experience, in the adult, under unusu­
al conditions, we have devised the following ex­
periment in an effort to determine whether they 
take place in more ordinary waking life, and if so, 
to study the manner of their occurrence:
An Experimental Study 
of
Approximately Meaningless Experience
Eleven subjects were used in the experiment 
of which the general method of procedure was as 
follows: With the subject and the experimenter
sitting one meter apart and face-to-face, the ex­
perimenter pronounced a word in a whisper with each 
beat of a metronome which was placed in an adjoin­
ing room so that its beats at intervals of one sec­
ond would not afford a distraction for the subject. 
The subject was ordered to slide his hand (which 
was placed palm down upon a table) about an inch 
to the left when the word no longer had meaning 
and to slide the hand back again when the meaning 
returned. At this time the experimenter made a 
short mark above a horizontal line with each beat 
of the metronome during which the hand signified 
presence of meanings and a mark below the line with 
each beat of the metronome signified as lacking () 
meaning. The experiment was continued with each of 
ten words until the meaning had departed and re­
turned ten times— the subject being instructed not 
to exert himself overmuch to keep the meanings but 
rather to allow them to flow about the stimulus
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word as freely as possible. The words— mother, up, 
mind, even, Kelly, truth, and, much, because, and 
nothing— were selected in order to vary the meaning 
content. Precaution was taken to maintain room 
temperature v/hieh was not conducive to drowsiness 
and to ascertain that the subject was in an easy 
posture. After some distraction occurred because 
of open eyes during the initial part of the experi­
ment, the subjects were henceforth instructed to 
close their eyes gently. No subject was used if 
at all fatigued, or for more than an hour at a sit­
ting. On an average of between two and three words 
were used in an hour, although in some cases but 
one word was finished in this time.
The technique of moving the hand was neces­
sary in order that the experimenter might have an 
objective record of the frequency and distribution 
of the various mental phenomena. Prom the outset, 
no hope was held out for the discovery of complete­
ly meaningless experiences— the purpose of the ex­
periment being to study approximations of meaning­
less experience in an ordinary condition of waking 
life. To instruct the subject to move his hand 
was an incidental matter of method in educating 
the subjects to the purpose of the research, since 
all were "green" insofar as the abstruse problem 
of meaning was concerned. Most of the subjects 
noted the intentional fallacy in the stated direc­
tions before having concluded with the first of 
the ten words, and moved their respective hands 
when the meaning seemed very dim, or after certain 
momentary lapses of consciousness to which they tes­
tified as having occurred. Therefore, it is plain 
that this technique detracts in no way from the 
value of the introspective reports. (In this con­
nection, it is interesting to note that several of 
the subjects testified that many of their "movings 
of the hand" were, insofar as they could determine 
by introspection, not consciously motivated.)
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Results: -
Three types of phenomena were revealed in 
the experiment, one of clear meanings, one of 
lapses of consciousness, or blankness, and an 
"intermediate'! type which was characterized by 
either extremely vagu.e meanings or a feeling of 
confusion. All of the subjects excepting three 
testified to experiences which may be classified' 
under each of these heads, and, as might' be ex-' 
pected, the three exceptions failed to observe com­
plete lapses of consciousness.
Testimony as to the occurrence of complete 
lapses of consciousness is as follows*.
.M. Ivl. : I did not "get the idea" until sever-,
al words had been used, but thereafter I observed 
in each word from one to five complete "gaps” of 
?i?hieh I was only conscious afterward and from 
which I could recall no quality. Insofar as I can ■ 
estimate the periods seem to have lasted but a 
second or two for the most part. One period from’ 
which I was "brought out” by the splash of an ' 
automobile through a puddle was much longer than 
the rest. I am never aware of such periods until' 
they are over.
. L. F. : I lost all consciousness for a flash
on one occasion.
M. C.: Only in four of the words did I have
meaningless experiences but all' instances except­
ing one of these were also qualityless. In this 
one case I have a.feeling that somehow the period 
wasn't empty.
F. E.: I had a number of seemingly blank
periods but they were too short to permit observa­
tion of their characteristics— if they had any.
When I am suddenly aware that a "blank" has flashed, 
there is a jumble of content in my consciousness, 
that is, nothing is organized momentarily. One of 
these gaps felt like a distinct hole in my con-
10
sciousness— like an unbridged gap,
F. W.: I believe that I had one completely
empty period daring the fifty word (Kelly) I 
suddenly had a meaning that there had. been no con­
tent to my consciousness. I was exceedingly wide 
awake during this particular part of the experi­
ment.
1. U.': There seems to me to be three dis­
tinct phases of experience in this experiment:
(l) Association (2) Mere awareness of stimulus (3) 
Blankness. I always moved my hand upon becoming 
suddenly conscious that I had passed through a 
blank period and then generally relapsed back in­
to almost meaninglessness which as well as I can 
gell is a state of awareness of stimulus without 
any associations. Once, intense and rapid assoc­
iations came into my mind and it was several mo­
ments before it occurred to me that I had "come 
out" of a blank period. In another instance I was 
at the height of meaningful experience; and later 
I was conscious that a gap must have suddenly in­
tervened between the period I was then in and the 
colorful meanings which were present a moment be­
fore. This last, is the first time that I have 
been able to notice a seemingly abrupt transition 
into a completely blank period. This "gap" phe­
nomenon is usually momentary when it takes place 
in my ordinary experiences.
S. S.: When I try to introspect the content
of those gaps I find nothing to introspect. I 
have a feeling that there has been a gap but cannot 
see what bridged the gap— I cannot see, how I got 
started again where I left off. In one instance I 
recalled a feeling of exertion but I am not sure 
whether this feeling came immediately after or 
during the period. I am not sure that I do not 
have a tendency to read meaning into what may be 
- mere quality at the time it is had. When the as­
sociations came to an end I have a completely 
blank period. While studying my lessons I often 
notice these gaps and am unable to attribute any 
content to them.
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W. 0.; It is difficult for me to be sure, 
but I think that I did have one or two flashes of 
complete blankness during the tenth word..
Note: .The remaining three subjects failed 
to appreciate the objective of the experiment and 
contributed no introspections of value to the 
problem.
In the light of these results we have evi­
dence that in our normal conscious life uncon­
scious periods seem* to occur which vary from mere 
flashes which are difficult to identify, to per­
iods of several seconds. Insofar as introspection 
can determine, such periods are "contentless." 
However, it is not unthinkable that they may pos­
sess content, but that such content cannot be re­
called since only meanings can be recalled. In 
this last case the content would be immediate qual­
ity. Reference to the introspective reports re­
veals a wide range of individual differences in 
respect to the frequency of the occurrence of the. 
"gaps." Since these "gaps" must be seen in rela­
tion to other phenomena brought out in the experi­
ment before their full significance can be under­
stood, we shall now proceed with a discussion of 
the phenomena most closely related to them— -which • 
we shall call the "intermediate" type.
How, the relation betv/een the "gaps" and the 
"intermediate" phenomena becomes more plain when 
it is known that the latter immediately follows 
the- "gaps" practically every time that they (the 
"gaps") occur. The three probably most expert 
subjects agree with subject S. S. when he says,
"I think that the really blank period takes place 
every time between the' cessation of association 
and the period of confusion, but sometimes it is 
so short as to cause me to doubt whether it oc­
curred or not." In fact, only on one occasion 
did a subject testify that he "came out" of a "gap"
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and fell so immediately on to a line of vivid as­
sociations that he noticed no "intermediate" or, 
in this case, adjustment period, W. 0., a mature 
student, was the one apparent exception insofar 
as having noted that the intermediate periods 
usually follow "gaps" is concerned. Reference 
to the introspections on "gaps" will show that 
she was in doubt as to whether she had any "gaps" 
at all. But, she had very distinct "intermediate" 
periods, all of which she described as periods of 
confusion. However, in the average case, these 
confusion periods sometimes followed discernible 
"gaps" and sometimes they.either did not follow 
"gaps" or else the "gaps" were too short to be 
recognized.
Another type of experience which we have pat 
into the "intermediate" class for convenience was 
that of -mere vagaeness of meaning when quality 
seemed to be proportionately vagae. Most of the 
subjects testified that the majority of their "in­
termediate" periods were of this type, but there 
were marked individual .differences in this respect.
The characteristics of the periods labelled 
"intermediate" may best be illustrated by the fol­
lowing typical introspections: (l) "During such
periods I am only aware of the dull beating of the 
stimulus." ('2) "The meaning that I was trying to 
think about the meaning characterized most of these 
periods." (3) "It is a period of confusion during 
which one is trying to get back to the associations 
again— a period when the content of consciousness 
is in a jumble and one has no definite meanings."
(4) "The only meaning was that there was no mean­
ing." (5) "Meanings seem to be trying to make 
themselves clear." (6) "I feel as I feel when a 
’Prof.’ asks me a question and I don’t know the 
answer— kind of blank and groping for a meaning."
(7) "Back in my consciousness there is always a 
dim awareness that meanings are the object of the 
experiment." (8) "There is an awareness of stim­
ulus without any association."
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All of the eleven subjects testified to hav­
ing experienced one or both of the types which 
we have placed in the "intermediate,r category.
The introspections listed above are merely illus­
trations of the different kinds of replies made—  
most of the subjects having made statements at 
different times which were substantially the same 
as several of those quoted. Briefly, however, 
the statements may be summarized by saying that 
at times these periods seem to have been but lulls 
in the vividness of me'aning, while at other times 
they were periods of confusion, of indefinite and 
confused meaning, of readjustment and attempt to 
force some definite meaning out of a chaos of con­
tent. The periods which were merely dim perhaps 
afford little evidence of meaningless experience 
since the lack of quality in such experiences was 
testified to be about as pronounced as the lack 
of vividness in the meaning. But, when it is re­
flected upon that the subjects observe their per­
iods of confusion to consist of bewildering my­
riads of experiences, and that these periods were 
said to have had content far out of proportion to 
the meaning present, we have some evidence in sup­
port of Dewey’s (3, p. 221) contention-that such 
periods are approximations of meaninglessness. 
(These seem to be the periods that Dewey (4, chap. 
1) in his book "How We. Think," designates as the 
first of five steps in reflective thinking. He 
calls this step that of a ’felt difficulty.')
Conclusion of Experiment;
Our specific conclusions are:
1. That the results point to the con­
clusion that experiences occur in our ordinary 
waking life which approximate meaningless experi­
ence.
2_. That momentary lapses of conscious­
ness take place in ordinary waking life, and that 
when the individual suddenly "comes out" of one of 
these he finds himself in a state of mental eonfu-
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sion,'' from which -he does not emerge until he begins 
to see relations.
3. That such periods of confusion either 
do not follow "gaps" in consciousness in some ca­
ses, or else the "gaps" are too short to he dis­
cernible.
4,. That the "gaps" are either lapses of 
consciousness or else true meaningless experiences 
which cannot be recalled since only meanings can 
be recalled.
_5. That the approximations of meaning- ’ 
less experTence brought oat usually follow a dis­
tinct "gap" in consciousness, and-are themselves 
followed by a. period of ordinary .associations—  
that is, by ordinary meaningful experience.
6. That different individuals vary great­
ly as to the time elapsing between the successive 
occurrences of the various phenomena brought out in 
the experiment.
We conclude, then, that we have found evidence 
of the occurrence of approximations of meaningless 
experience in the ordinary waking life of the adult 
and we have discovered some of the factors influenc­
ing its occurrence.
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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 'MEANINGLESS EXPERIENCE*
What, then, are the implications of these re­
salts for psychology? What significant hearing do 
they hare apon the definition of the major con­
cepts of the science of psychology—  such as a 
definition of psychology itself, of mind, of con­
sciousness, of perception, of the odea,, of the im­
age, and of sensory data? What is the possible 
desirability of a reconstruction of the fundamen­
tal concepts of psychology at which we may arrive?
Now, we may best answer the last question first. 
In other words, just, what pragmatic value is there 
for a reconstruction of the fundamental concepts 
of psychology;or for finding a more accurate em­
pirical basis for them? Tersely, even though we 
were unable to predict the practical consequences, 
such a reconstruction has a theoretical justifica­
tion since the "pure" science generally precedes 
the applied. And, any concepts which more accu­
rately describe the empirical facts should ulti­
mately facilitate the handling of such facts.
The present thesis maintains that psychology 
is the science of experiencing, and as such includes 
both meaningful and meaningless experiences in 
spite of the fact that the latter may not be in­
trospective material in their pure state. The 
legitimacy of meaningful experience as subject 
matter in a science will not be contested, but, it 
may be asked, how can meaningless experience, as 
such, at the time it is had, is indefinable, be 
subject matter of psychology? It is replied that 
experience in its immediacy (meaningless experience) 
is the initial 'stuff’ which, when relationships’ 
are seen between its different occurrences, takes 
on meaning. And, that any definition is but a com­
posite of meanings which takes cognizance-‘of the 
primeval 'stuff’ from which they spring, and not a
definition of immediate experience as such; Hence, 
we are justified in using immediate experience as 
subject matter of psychology.
Next, what is the bearing of meaningless ex­
perience upon the definition of ’mind1? Upon this 
point perhaps we can do. no better than to quote 
Dewey (5, pp. 271, 278, 274, 276) who writes, ’’The 
conclusion seems inevitable that since mind does 
not appear, in the original list of instincts, it 
represents something acquired." "It is a forma­
tion, not a datum; a product and a cause only af­
ter it has been produced." "Instincts become 
mind when they are organized, and directed with 
reference to the ends;of attention, esteem, and 
endeavor which are supplied by the shared life of 
the place and time. The hind of mind they become 
depends upon the kind of objects of attention 
which the specific social conditions supply."
Thus, a human mind is seen to consist of the sys- : 
tem of meanings which the individual has acquired■ 
as the result of an interaction between,his pe­
culiar innate capacity and his peculiar environ­
ment. And, accordingly,'insofar as the animal 
can see consequences before they actually occur; 
insofar as his responses are not directly to 
stimuli, he may be said to possess mind; while, 
insofar as they are direct responses to stimuli, 
they must be considered as on. the biological level 
rather than as upon the mental plane. Thus, ’mind 
which, as we have seen, is a system of meanings, 
is evolved from a basis of meaningless experiences 
And, accordingly, ’mind’ is not inclusive of all 
the subject matter of psychology, as is often as­
sumed.
Consideration of "consciousness" logically 
follows. Before attempting to show the implica­
tions of meaningless experience for consciousness 
we shall try to make our own theory more under­
standable by a few quotations from, the writings 
of John Dewey. Professor Dewey pictures the dif­
ference between meaningless and meaningful con­
sciousness in saying (3, p. 313) that whenever
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meaningful consciousness occurs "there is a ’mom­
ent1 of hesitation; there are scruples, reserva­
tions, in complete overt action." (By "complete 
overt action" Dewey means direct response to 
stimulus, which, on its subjective side, calls 
for meaningless experience.) Then again, (3, p. 
343) "But the view of complete separation of 
existential consciousness (immediate conscious­
ness) from connection with physical things cannot 
be maintained in view of what is known if its 
specifiable connections with organic conditions, 
and of the intimate unbroken connection of organ­
ic with extra-organic events." In this sentence 
he suggests that there is no specifiable point in 
nature at which we are justified in dogmatically 
asserting consciousness to make its appearance.
When one reflects upon meaningless consciousness 
as perhaps .extending in some way even to the in­
organic one can "feel" the notion of meaningless 
experience even though he cannot describe it. A 
particularly clarifying discussion is the follow­
ing^, p. 336): "It is usual in current psycholo­
gy to assert.or assume that qualities observed are 
those of the stimulus. This assumption puts the 
cart before the horse; qualities which are observed 
are those attendant upon response to stimuli. We 
are observantly aware (in distinction from infer- 
entially aware) only of what has been done; we can 
perceive what is already there, what has happened." 
Here, Professor Dewey has shown that what we are 
conscious of is our response to the stimulus and 
not the stimulus in its immediacy. He has further 
implied that we are conscious (meaningfully) of an 
experience in its immediacy only after it has oc­
curred and it is only in immediate experience or 
meaningless consciousness that we are directly 
conscious of a stimulus.
We are now naturally "led to a discussion of 
theories of "consciousness"--the term which, as 
Titchener says (18, p. 17) "has many meanings."
We cannot attempt a complete critique on the sub­
ject, but it is, however, incumbent upon us that 
we take cognizance of the two most widely accepted
18
definitions. These are: (1) that consciousness
is a state of awareness, and (2) that conscious­
ness is a cross-section of mind--mind being con­
ceived of as the sum-total of mental processes 
occurring during the lifetime of an individual.
We shall, then, attempt,to indicate the difficul­
ties of these most typical of current definitions, 
and to point out how meaningless experience will 
meet them.
Three able champions of the theory that -eon-, 
sciousness is a state of awareness are Warren, An- 
gell, and Dunlap. Warren (20, p. 122) says that 
"consciousness is one of those facts of which we 
are all aware but cannot define"— that it is a 
state of awareness. Angell (l, p. l) says, "Con­
sciousness we can only define in terms' of itself. 
Sensations, ideas, pains, pleasures, acts of mem­
ory, imagination, and will--these may serve to 
illustrate the experience's we mean to indicate by * 
the term; and our best endeavor to construct a 
successful definition results in some such list, 
of which we can only say: These taken together
are all we can mean by consciousness." And, Dun­
lap writes, (6, p. 22) "Consciousness .as precisely 
uged in psychology means merely awareness of some­
thing, ,and wherever we find the word consciousness 
we can substitute perfectly the word awareness."
In other words, Dunlap would also define con­
sciousness in terms of itself since he would de­
fine it in terms of its synonym. How, in view of 
the fact that a definition consists of describing 
an object in terms of other objects (3, p. 284) 
and not in describing the thing in itself, we 
must conclude that the above definitions are not 
definitions at all. Having noted this fact, 
wherein does meaningless experience have impli­
cations for it? Specifically, we have been able 
to legitimately define consciousness on its mean­
ingful level as the process of acquiring a new 
meaning. And although, as Dewey says, (3, p. 307) 
"It is impossible to tell what immediate conscious­
ness is,"-— we can be means of inference arrive at 
a conclusion that the primary data of experience
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are such unrelated experiences. Consequently, we 
have been able to define ordinary meaningful con­
sciousness and have been able to point to the 
'something' from which it is developed.
We are now r^ady to indicate the bearing of 
meaningless experience Upon the 'cross-section of 
mind' theory which has been so ably championed by 
Titchener. At the outset it will be clear that 
this theory is closely analogous to ours. Where­
as, we have defined mind as the system of mean­
ings which an individual has acquired during his 
lifetime, Titchener has described it as "the sum- 
total of mental processes occurring during one's ' 
lifetime." And, whereas, we have defined meaning­
ful consciousness as the process of having a new 
meaning, he has described it as a cross-section 
of the mind-stream. Titchener observed that the 
first experiences of a child are meaningless but 
this fact does not deter him from implicitly as­
suming that for most practical purposes only adult 
introspections are of consequence. This last is 
illustrated when he says that (19, p. 104) "aware­
ness is of two principal kinds: awareness of
meaning, and awareness of relation." For this 
statement clearly limits consciousness to meaning­
fulness since, according to the present thesis, 
it might as well be stated as follows:."conscious­
ness is of two principal kinds: consciousness of
meaning and consciousness of relation (which is 
merely a type of meaningful consciousness). Now, 
bearing in mind the fact that most of our mental
life is in the sphere of meanings, and that Titch­
ener' s definitions of mind and consciousness are 
virtually the same as ours, we must conclude that 
recognition of the true significance of the mean­
ingless experience concept would seem to be pri­
marily of theoretical value to him insofar as con­
sciousness itself is concerned.
After having reflected Upon the preceding ap­
plications of meaningless consciousness, the con­
ception should be more tangible to us and its ird—
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plications for the interesting problem involved 
in Munsterberg's definition of consciousness may 
be brought out with little difficulty. Munster - 
berg (12, p. 4) says that consciousness is an ab­
straction from sensations, volitions, ideas, imag­
es,. .-and feelings. How, since all scientific terms 
are abstractions, we agree that consciousness as 
a term of psychology must be an abstraction, but 
the concept of meaningless experience demands that 
we recognize a consciousness which is not an ab­
straction and this is the immediate fact of con­
sciousness, or meaningless experience.
Having indicated the significance of meaning­
less experience for consciousness, a discussion 
normally follows of its relation to what has of­
ten been called the ,Tatom of psychology"— that is, 
the sensation or "sensory data." In the main 
body of this thesis we have, in effect, discussed 
much of what might be said on the subject with­
out mentioning 'sensations1 specifically. Mean­
ingless experience, if accepted, involves a den­
ial of sensations such as sounds, colors, etc., 
as being the 'atoms' of experience. The real 
'atoms' are said to be immediate experiences. 
Professor Dewey (3, p. 327) defines sensations as' 
follows: "Sensa are the class of irreducible
meanings which are employed in verifying and 
correcting other me anings." For instance, the 
experiencing of red is not a meaningless experi­
ence for the reason that such an experience at 
least has the meaning of being red. 'Redness' is 
a concept and all concepts are embodiments of 
meaning. As in the case of consciousness, sen­
sations can be thought of as meaningful and mean­
ingless. The'meaningless sensations are immedi­
ate experiences while the meaningful sensations 
are the most elementary meanings which we can use 
in "verifying and correcting other meanings"--the 
sensations of ordinary psychology.
We have said that 'sensory data' are not 
meaningless experiences. How, James (8, p. 7), 
Gault and Howard (7, p. 166), Gole (2, p. 147),
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and others, recognize the possibility of "pure 
sensations" in early infanthood, hat they fail to 
make explicit how extremely different these are 
from the "sensations" of orthodox psychology, 
likewise, they do not take cognizance of the im­
plications of this difference to a psychology 
which is to be consistent with empirical findings. 
Some distinction between the "sensations" of the 
adult and the "pare sensations" of the infant is 
observed, bat the fact that herein lies the key 
to the canses of mach psychological controversy 
has escaped notice. That the primary data of ex­
perience are immediate qualities is in effect ad­
mitted and then the matter is dropped withoat any 
significance of great import having been attached 
to it.
A conception of sensation into which the con­
cept of meaningless experience may easily be in­
tro daced has been stated as follows by Gault and 
Howard (7, p. 166): "We spoke of sensation in a
former chapter as a conscioasness of difference.
The brightness of the atmosphere about as at this 
moment is different from that of a moment ago.
The conscioasness of this difference at the time 
at which it appeared is a sensation. The coarse 
of atmospheric vibrations to which we are accus­
tomed as we sit in oar study as sharply altered, 
and theib is, at that moment, another sensation: 
this one of another quality— auditory. It is the 
mere awareness of 'something there' that is dif­
ferent from what was there a moment ago. What 
that something is— we do not so much as have a 
name for it." How, this reference shows clearly 
how its authors explain the intrinsic meaning- 
fulness of consciousness. They analyze exper­
ience down to the most elementary meaning con­
ceivable and dismiss any reference to the'some­
thing' .between which differences are said to exist. 
This 'something' is what we have called "immediate 
quality" or meaningless experience.
As we have shown, 'sensations' are elementary 
meanings. Then, it follows that 'sense-psrception’
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is a matter of experiencing sensations, that is, 
of experiencing a type of meanings. The meaning­
less experience concept, therefore, has little 
hearing upon 1 sense-perception’ upon its own ac­
count. However, since there is often a confusion 
of the larger sense of the term ’perception1 with 
1sense-perception’ and meaningless experience has 
implications for the former, we shall distinguish 
them. Upon this point Professor Dewey says (3, p. 
338) that ’’while the word ’perception’ may he 
limited to designate awareness of objects contem­
poraneously affecting the bodily organs, there is 
no ground whatever for the assumption which has 
usually attended this narrowing of the older mean­
ing of the word: namely, that sense-perception
has intrinsic properties or qualities marking it 
off from other forms of consciousness.” Here Pro­
fessor Dewey is suggesting that the difference be­
tween sense-perception and introspection (a lar­
ger sense of the term ’perception’) is not due 
to intrinsic properties since both are processes 
of having meanings. How, the fact that meaning­
ful consciousness denotes the process of acquir­
ing a new meaning at once suggests that it is syn­
onymous with perception when the latter is osed in 
its most inclusive sense as including introspec­
tion, sense-perception, etc. The concept of mean­
ingless experience is thus seen to demand its 
most revolutionary change for psychology in the 
case of its identification of the time honored 
concepts of•consciousness and perception.
Perception, of course, involves ideas and 
images, the concepts to which meaningless experi­
ence offers the least innovation. In our scheme, 
an idea is a meaning, while the psychologists’ 
image as Pillsbury (16, p. 157) wrote long ago, 
is but one meaning' among many. In other words, in 
the sense in which the' term is generally used, an 
image is but one of our many ideas. Our theory 
renders service in that it emphasizes the fact 
that whenever we are meaningfully conscious an 
idea is present, since a meaning is present. And, 
it is also of value in showing that an idea may 
be the relationship between immediate qualities 
in addition to its generally accepted connotation
23
of the relationship between meanings. It is thus, 
that meaningless experience indicates the occurrence 
of ideas which are so simple that they probably 
are not introspective material.
In further discussion of perception, it 
should be said that the new 'Gestalt’ psychology, 
which is primarily a theory of perception, may 
make one of its principal contributions in fur­
thering the notion of meaningless experience. For 
the ’Gestalt’ implicitly accepts the implications 
of this notion. For instance, Kohler (10, p. 193)' 
suggests the concept when he speaks of "purely op­
tical entities" becoming "imbued with meanings."
And then, the ’Gestalt's1 construction of our-react­
ing to situations as a whole rather than in parts . 
is clearly suggestive of our conclusion that con­
sciousness or perceptive awareness is the process 
of having a new meaning, for under our construction 
we are inevitably reacting to whole situations 
whenever we react.
Mention of ’Gestalt’ psychology is incomplete 
without some suggestion of animal psychology— the 
field to which it has made such noteworthy contri­
butions. In this relation, study of the mental 
processes of animals has long been a fascinating 
sphere of psychology and for a long time many ani­
mals were &iven credit for almost human powers.
The natural tendency to read human meanings into 
the acts of animals finally led psychologists to 
follow the’principle of parsimony’ 'in .judging ani­
mal intelligence. The 'principle of parsimony’ 
was that in giving the animal credit for as little 
understanding as possible under the circumstances, 
the most nearly correct conclusion would most like­
ly be had. Now, it remained for Kohler and his 
'Gestalt' psychology to prove that the intelligence 
of at least some of the higher animals had been 
underrated. Even Professor Dewey has pursued the 
customary fallacy. For instance, he says (3, p.
185), "The most convincing evidence that animals 
do not 'think' is found in the fact that they have 
no tools, but depend upon 'their own relatively-fixed
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bodily structures to effect results." Kohler (9), 
in his book, "The Mentality of Apes," has convinc­
ingly shown that the chimpanzee not only uses tools 
bat constracts tools. He has shown that some ani­
mals experience complex meanings, in contradiction 
to the ontil recently carrent tendency to limit 
animal mental functions to the reflex and condi­
tioned reflex, that is, to implicitly accredit the 
animal with no, or practically no, meanings. How, 
accrediting some animals with meaningfal experience, 
what is the bearing of meaningless experience upon 
animal psychology? One point is that we can find no 
point at which to say, "From here up:in the scale of 
evolution, all animals have meaningfal experience, 
while below this point only meaningless experiences 
are had." Therefore, the transition must be a gradual 
one. For the present, the 'Gestalt1 seems to offer 
the most promise toward the narrowing of this zone 
of uncertainty. A second point is that animal 
psychology is generally thought adequately explained 
in terms of reflexes which have been studied prin­
cipally from the behavioristic (obpctive) point of 
view. And, since meaningless experience is the 
subjective side of the cortical reflexes, we have 
in this concept an explanation of the nature of the 
much neglected subjective side of a large portion of 
animal life.
There is no more fitting subject with which we 
may conclude our treatment of meaningless experience 
than that of its relation to meaning itself. We 
have defined meaning as seeing relations between ex- 
periences rather than having the experiences in 
their immediacy, and have shown that the newborn 
infant has no meanings since ha has never experienced 
anything in relation to something else. It is thus 
that we have shown consciousness not to be intrin- . 
sically meaningful. Titchener's (19, p. 175) state­
ment that meaning is a matter of context, that is, 
that experiences .have meaning only because of the - 
background of previous experiences, is, of course, 
identical with ours. And, -for— most practical purposes,
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this is the stand of psychologists in general, 
in spite of the fact that some of them endeavor 
to maintain the intrinsic meaningfa 1 ne ss of c on- 
scioasness. The one theory with which we shall' 
take issiae is that of Professor .Dewey (3, Chap. 5). 
Dewey contends that all meanings are acquired in 
social situations and that since animals do not 
have such situations their experiences are meaning­
less. (A social situation, he defines as seeing 
things as a function in another's experience.) 
Having in mind Kohler's experiments with apes one > 
cannot accept the idea that all animal experience ’ 
is meaningless, and consequently mast either con­
clude that meanings do not have to be acqaired in 
social sitaations, or that animals have social 
sithati on s.
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SUMMARY OF OOI’TGLUglOM’S 
This discussion has shown:
•1. That consciousness is not intrinsi­
cally meaningful as is contended by many authori­
ties and implicitly assumed for most practical 
purposes by mosi} others^
2. That the newborn infant has .meaning­
less experience;
3. That the adult approximates haying 
meaningless experience and may actually have it;
4. That approximations of meaningless 
experience occur in the adult in ordinary waking 
life as well as in certain pmareiai conditions;
5. That though the occurrence of mean­
ingless experience is not denied by some of the 
prominent psychologists, no particular importance 
has been assigned to it;
6. And, that acceptance of ’meaningless 
experience’ has implications which necessitate a 
redefinition of the fundamental terms of psycholo­
gy-*
*The significance of ’meaningless experience* 
for religion has been discussed by Wieman (21).
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